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PRINTZ v. UNITED STATES: AN ASSAULT
UPON THE BRADY ACT OR A TENTH
AMENDMENT FORTIFICATION?
Laws, to be effective, therefore, must not be laid on states, but
upon individuals.'
Under the federal system of government, power is divided be-
tween the national government and the states.2 Although the
powers of the national government have gradually expanded, the
Tenth Amendment (the "Amendment")3 has traditionally been
available to protect the states from the unwarranted intrusion of
federal legislation.4 The Supreme Court's struggle to fix the
Amendment's parameters has resulted in an indefinite history,5
1 J. ELLioT, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 56 (2d ed. 1863) (statement of Ru-
fus King, delegate to the Constitutional Convention).
2 See BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 612 (6th ed. 1990). Federalism is defined as a "[tierm
which includes interrelationships among the states and relationships between the states
and the federal government." Id.; Bryan H. Wildenthal, Judicial Philosophies in Collision:
Justice Blackmun, Garcia, and the Tenth Amendment, 32 AIuz. L. REv. 749, 754 (1990)
(defining federalism as division of power between states and federal government). For fur-
ther explanation of the concept of federalism and its implications, see William Van Alstyne,
Federalism, Congress, the States and the Tenth Amendment: Adrift in the Cellophane Sea,
1987 DuKE L.J. 769, 770-74 (defining federalism in constitutional context and outlining its
boundaries).
3 U.S. CONST. amend. X. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitu-
tion, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people." Id.
4 See, e.g., New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408,2417 (1992). The Court stated: "If
a power is delegated to Congress in the Constitution, the Tenth Amendment expressly dis-
claims any reservation of that power to the States; if a power is an attribute of state sover-
eignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment, it is necessarily a power the Constitution has
not conferred on Congress." Id.; see also Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469
U.S. 528, 549 (1985) ("The States unquestionably do 'retai[n] a significant measure of sov-
ereign authority.' They do so, however, only to the extent that the Constitution has not
divested them of their original powers and transferred those powers to the Federal Govern-
ment.") (quoting EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 269 (1983) (Powell, J., dissenting)). In
cases such as these, the court is asked to determine whether Congress has invaded a power
of the state reserved to it by the Tenth Amendment. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2417.
5 See New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. at 2428 (finding section of Low-Level Radio-
active Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, requiring states to either adopt plan consis-
tent with Congress's standards or to take title to waste produced, unconstitutional under
the Tenth Amendment because this commandeered powers of state); South Carolina v.
Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 513 (1988) (finding section of Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility
Act, which removed federal income tax exemption for interest earned on state and local
government bearer bonds, constitutional because South Carolina did not show any defect in
political process that adopted Act); Garcia, 469 U.S. at 557 (overruling National League of
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), by holding Federal Labor Standards Act ("FLSA7) is
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with many twentieth century commentators claiming that the
Amendment no longer has any real legal force.6 In 1976, the Court
breathed new life into the Tenth Amendment in National League
of Cities v. Usery." Subsequent decisions eroded and eventually
overruled National League of Cities, reasserting the strength of
federal legislation.' The recent Supreme Court decision in New
an extension of state and local government employees' constitutional rights because FLSA
was enacted under one of Congress's delegated powers and constituted generally applicable
law); EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 239 (1983) (upholding amendments to Age Discrim-
ination in Employment Act which extended it to employees of state and local governments
because intrusion on state's ability to structure its integral operations was minimal); FERC
v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 760-61 (1982) (upholding constitutionality of Public Utility
Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 because federal government has power to require state util-
ity regulatory commissions, as equivalent to judicial tribunals, to enforce federal law); Ho-
del v. Virginia Surface & Mining Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264,287-88 (1981) (establish-
ing that each of following three requirements must be met to invalidate congressional
commerce power legislation on Tenth Amendment grounds: (1) challenged statute must
"regulat[e] the States as States" (quoting National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 854); (2)
statute must impact on matters that are indisputably "attribute[s] of state sovereignty"
(quoting National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 845); and (3) state compliance with federal
statute must directly impair the state's ability "to structure integral operations in areas of
traditional governmental functions" (quoting National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852));
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 845 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). The Court found that amendments to
the FLSA making the Act applicable to all employees of state and local governments were
unconstitutional because they intruded upon an inviolable area of state sovereignty and
were unconstitutional legislation of "States as States." Id.; United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d
1342, 1366-67 (1993) (holding Gun-Free School Zones Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1988), which
makes it unlawful for any individual knowingly to possess firearm in school zone, invalid as
beyond power of Congress under Commerce Clause), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 1536 (1994).
6 See, e.g., William T. Barrante, States Rights and Personal Freedom Breathing Life into
the Tenth Amendment, 63 CoNN. B.J. 262, 262 (1989) (concluding that Garcia was "death
knell" for Tenth Amendment as effective limit on federal government); Kathryn Abrams,
Note, On Reading and Using the Tenth Amendment, 93 YALE L.J. 723, 723 (1984) (taking
note of many reports of death of Tenth Amendment, but feeling reports have been exagger-
ated). But see Van Alstyne, supra note 2, at 799 n.15 (stressing reservation of powers by
Tenth Amendment "which ought not be lightly dismissed as merely tautological... [ilts
dismissal as a truism' by Justice Stone in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941)
was more hubris than insight").
7 426 U.S. 833, 845 (1976). The Court stated that "there are attributes of sovereignty
attaching to every state government which may not be impaired by Congress, not because
Congress may lack an affirmative grant of legislative authority to reach the matter, but
because the Constitution prohibits it from exercising the authority in that matter." Id.
8 See Barrante, supra note 6, at 273. National League of Cities was "not a strong Tenth
Amendment case" because it misinterpreted the division of powers in the Tenth Amend-
ment that certain powers are delegated to Congress, while other powers are reserved to the
States. Id. The Court in National League of Cities misconstrued the Tenth Amendment by
stating that Congress had a constitutional grant of authority through the Commerce
Clause but was limited by the federal structure of government. Id. The Court should have
found that Congress did not even have an affirmative grant of power under the Commerce
Clause, not merely that this power was somehow limited. Id.; see also Garcia, 469 U.S. at
546-547 (rejecting as "unsound in principle and unworkable in practice, Hodel/National
League of Cities rule of state immunity from federal regulation that turns on judicial ap-
praisal of whether particular governmental function is "integral" or "traditional"); EEOC v.
Wyoming, 460 U.S. at 239 (noting that even if state's ability to structure integral opera-
tions was impaired, degree of intrusion also had to be considered); Hodel, 452 U.S. at 287-
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York v. United States,9 however, has brought this debate full cir-
cle,10 protecting state sovereignty and refusing to allow Congress
to intrude upon states' rights through federal regulations.'" This
interpretation further complicated the Tenth Amendment's his-
torically dubious strictures because it created a conflict with con-
gressional power.1
2
Generally, federal statutes which present states with an un-
funded mandate face a constitutional challenge.1 3 In these situa-
88. Hodel refined the broad principles announced in National League of Cities by establish-
ing a three prong test to invalidate legislation under the Tenth Amendment: 1) the federal
statute must regulate the States as States; 2) it must impact on indisputable attributes of
state sovereignty; and 3) compliance with the statute must impair integral state operations
in traditional government function areas. Id.
9 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992).
10 Id. at 2429 (holding that "take-title" provision of Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy
Amendments Act of 1985 was "inconsistent with the federal structure of our Government
established by the Constitution").
11 Id. at 2428 (agreeing with petitioners' argument that Tenth Amendment would allow
direct regulation of generators and disposers of waste, but would limit Congress's power
with respect to state legislation). The Court stated: "A choice between two unconstitution-
ally coercive regulatory techniques [either requiring states to take title to waste or regulate
it according to federal standards] is no choice at all." Id.; see also Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288
(holding that Congress cannot "commandee[r] the legislative processes of the States by di-
rectly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program"); Printz v.
United States, 854 F. Supp. 1503, 1513 (D. Mont. 1994). The court concluded that "the
ascertainment/background check provision of the Act exceeds the powers delegated to Con-
gress and violates the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution because it substantially com-
mandeers state executive officers and indirectly commandeers the legislative processes of
the state .... " Id.
12 See U.S. CONST. art. I. This provision expressly delegates specific powers to Congress.
Id. Section 8 of Article I contains the Commerce Clause powers: 'The Congress shall have
power... [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States .... "
Id. § 8. See New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2417 (1992). The Supreme Court
has noted that the Tenth Amendment question can be approached from two angles which
become the "mirror images" of one another. Id. When deciding the division of authority
between federal and state governments the inquiry is whether the statute exercises an
Article I power or whether the power is exclusive of Article I, thereby reserved to the states
by the Tenth Amendment. Id.; see also United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941)
(noting that Tenth Amendment "states but a truism that all is retained which has not been
surrendered [as Article I power]").
13 See, e.g., Printz, 854 F. Supp. at 1507. The issue turned on the constitutionality of
federally imposed unfunded mandates on the states. Id. Here the plaintiff-sheriff "testified
that enforcement of the Act forces him to re-allocate already limited resources such that he
is unable to carry out certain duties prescribed by state law." Id.; see also Edward A. Zelin-
sky, Unfunded Mandates, Hidden Taxation, and the Tenth Amendment: On Public Choice,
Public Interest, and Public Services, 46 VAmD. L. REv. 1355, 1356 (1993). The author ex-
plores "the tendency of federal and state officials to impose unfinanced obligations on lower
levels of government despite the near universal condemnation of this practice." Id. Oppo-
nents of such mandates argue that where the federal government directs the state govern-
ments to provide certain important services, Congress should also supply the states with
the requisite funds. Id. at 1363 (quoting JOSEPH E. STiGLrrz, EcoNoMICS OF THE PUBLIC
SECTOR 550 (1986)). Mr. Zelinsky concluded that unfunded mandates pose a constitutional
conflict and therefore must be remedied by constitutional action and not by "supermajority
and reimbursement rules." Zelinsky, supra, at 1414-15.
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tions, the federal government is usually acting to remedy or pro-
tect a matter of national concern, 14 and has decided that the
states should bear the cost of curative legislation.'1  The Brady
Handgun Violence Prevention Act (the "Act"),16 amending the
Gun Control Act of 1968,17 has been challenged as such an un-
funded mandate.'" Recently, in Printz v. United States,'9 the first
judicial review of the background check provision contained in the
Act,2 ° the Federal District Court of Montana applied the Supreme
Court's current Tenth Amendment position.21 The Printz court
found that the Act's gun purchaser background check provision
14 See, e.g., New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2414 (1992) (disposal of low-level
radioactive waste by 1980 had become problem of crisis proportions in United States);
Printz, 854 F. Supp. at 1512-18 (discussing Tenth Amendment with respect to another
hotly contested topic, gun control); John M. Lingelbach, Note, The Tenth Amendment and
the Federal Power to Direct Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal: New York v. United
States, 26 CREIGHTON L. REv. 557, 560 (1993) (discussing seriousness of low-level radioac-
tive waste crisis).
15 Printz, 854 F. Supp. at 1515 (noting that elected bodies of states would be indirectly
required to utilize their resources to support Act if background check provision was held
constitutional).
16 Pub. L. No. 103-159, tit. 1 § 102(aXl), 107 Stat. 1536 (1993) [hereinafter the Act]
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(sX2) (Supp. V 1993) (amending Gun control Act of 1968, 18
U.S.C. § 921 (1988)).
17 18 U.S.C. § 922 (Supp. V 1993).
18 See 18 U.S.C. § 922(sX2) (Supp. V 1993). An interim provision of the Act requires the
chief legal enforcement officer ("CLEO") in each state local jurisdiction to "make a reason-
able effort to ascertain" whether a prospective buyer may lawfully complete his purchase.
Id. Four other district courts have found this provision to be an unconstitutional exercise of
congressional power. See Frank v. United States, 860 F. Supp. 1030 (D. Vt. 1994); Mack v.
United States, 856 F. Supp. 1372 (D. Ariz. 1994); McGee v. United States, No. Civ.A. 2:94-
CV-67PS, 1994 WL 506156 (S.D. Miss., June 3, 1994); Printz v. United States, 854 F. Supp.
1503 (D. Mont. 1994) (describing rationales and holdings for finding Act unconstitutional).
See also infra notes 97-102 and accompanying text (discussing rationales behind decisions).
19 854 F. Supp. 1503. (D. Mont. 1994).
20 See id.; Frank v. United States, 860 F. Supp. 1030 (D. Vt. 1994) (holding that provi-
sion of Brady Act which required background checks on firearms purchasers violates Tenth
Amendment); Mack v. United States, 856 F. Supp. 1372 (D. Ariz. 1994) (same provision
requiring local law enforcement officials to conduct background checks was unconstitu-
tional); McGee v. United States, No. CivA. 2:94-CV-67PS, 1994 WL 506156 (S.D. Miss.
June 3, 1994) (same mandatory background check provision of Brady Act unconstitution-
ally directed local officials to administer federal regulatory program); Koog v. United
States, 852 F. Supp. 1376 (W.D. Tex. 1994) (same provision held inconsistent with Tenth
Amendment).
21 Printz, 854 F. Supp. at 1513 (deciding that analysis Supreme Court used in New York
v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992), finding regulation mandated by Congress uncon-
stitutional, was applicable to background check provision of Act). The Printz court also
specifically noted that: "This is not a case about the Second Amendment. This case turns on
the proper relationship between the federal government and the several states ... ." Id. at
1506; see also Frank v. United States, 860 F. Supp. 1030, 1043 n.15 (declaring "[allthough
the subject of federal law challenged here is the transfer of handguns, this case has abso-
lutely nothing to do with the Second Amendment or the right to bear arms"); Joe Albo,
Background Checks, PHoma GAZE'r, July 21, 1994, at B6 (noting that Brady law's effect
has no impact on Second Amendment debate).
PRINTZ v. UNITED STATES
exceeded congressional power2 2 because it substantially comman-
deered state executive officers and resources, 23 and indirectly com-
mandeered state legislatures.24 The court preserved the purpose
and spirit of the Act by appropriately severing the unconstitu-
25tional provisions. Alternatively, an effective compromise could
be reached through background checks enacted by states as a re-
sult of the federal government's persuasive taxation and spending
powers.26
This Note will present a constitutional analysis of a chronic con-
troversy in American jurisprudence-the delicate balance of pow-
ers between the federal and state governments. Part One will
briefly explore the historical and factual circumstances surround-
ing the Brady Act. Furthermore, it will demonstrate, in the con-
text of Printz, how Tenth Amendment problems can arise. Part
Two will discuss the struggle to define the Tenth Amendment's
parameters and then evaluate the inconsistent judicial interpreta-
tions in light of New York. Part Three will discuss the Act's back-
ground check provision as a congressional mandate beyond the
scope of the Commerce Clause and will compare Printz with New
York. Part Four will discuss the viability of the Act and possible
alternatives. Finally, Part Five will submit that although note-
worthy, the goals of gun control do not automatically warrant a
constitutional reading of the Act.
I. THE BRADY HANDGUN VIOLENCE PREVENTION ACT
On November 30, 1993, Congress enacted the Brady Handgun
Violence Prevention Act,27 which changed the procedure for
22 Printz, 854 F. Supp. at 1513.
23 Printz, 854 F. Supp. at 1519. Similar to the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act
amendments under attack in New York, § 922(sX2) of the Brady Act requires state and
local officials to administer the act, bear accountability for its effectiveness, and bear the
financial burden of its administration. Id. at 1517-18. The Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Policy Act amendments, which require the states to either take title to any waste in their
jurisdiction or to regulate it according to federally imposed standards, were found to be
unconstitutional because of their inconsistency with the federal structure imposed by the
Constitution. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2429. State sovereignty protected by the Tenth
Amendment and the inherent limitations imposed by the enumerated Article I powers com-
posed the foundation of the decision. Id.
24 Printz v. United States, 854 F. Supp. 1503, 1519 (D. Mont. 1994).
25 See infra notes 124-42 and accompanying text (detailing severability remedy).
26 See infra notes 143-50 and accompanying text (describing efforts certain states have
taken in statutory provisions to control licensing, possession, and carrying of firearms by
requiing permits that involve substantial background check).
27 18 U.S.C. § 922(sX2) (Supp. V 1993).
1994]
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purchasing handguns.2 8 The interim provision 29 of the Act re-
quires a waiting period of five business days before handgun
purchases" can be made from federally licensed gun dealers.3 1
During that time, the chief law enforcement officer ("CLEO")32 for
each jurisdiction is required to exert a "reasonable effort to ascer-
tain" whether the transferee's receipt or possession of a handgun
would violate the law. 3 The background check is based on a
sworn statement that the prospective purchaser provides to the
federal gun dealer,3 a who in turn provides it to the local CLEO. 5
28 See supra note 16 and accompanying text (discussing legislative history of Brady Act).
29 See 18 U.S.C. § 922(tXl) (Supp. V 1993) (stating that interim provisions of statute are
to be replaced by national instant criminal background check system to be developed and
maintained by Department of Justice within five years from date of enactment).
30 See 18 U.S.C. § 922(29) (Supp. V 1993). The Act defined "handgun" by amending 18
U.S.C. § 921(a) to create a new subsection, (29), which states that the term "handgun"
means: "(A) a firearm which has a short stock and is designed to be held and fired by the
use of a single hand; and (B) any combination of parts from which a firearm described in
subparagraph (a) can be assembled." Id. § 922(29).
31 18 U.S.C. § 922(sX2) (Supp. V 1993).
32 See id. Section 922(s)(8) defines "chief law enforcement officer": "For purposes of this
subsection, the term 'chief law enforcement officer' means the chief of police, the sheriff, or
an equivalent officer or the designee of any such individual." Id.
33 Id. The provision, in its entirety states:
A chief law enforcement officer to whom a transferor has provided notice pursuant to
paragraph (1XAXiXIII) shall make a reasonable effort to ascertain within 5 business
days whether receipt or possession would be in violation of the law, including research
in whatever State and local record keeping systems are available and in a national
system designated by the Attorney General.
Id.
34 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(1XA)(iI) (Supp. V 1993). This provision prohibits any licensed gun
importer, manufacturer, or dealer from selling, delivering, or transferring a handgun to an
individual unless the transferor has "received from the transferee a statement of the trans-
feree containing the information described in paragraph (3)." Id. Paragraph (3) provides in
relevant part:
The statement referred to in paragraph (1)AXi)(I) shall contain only-
(A) the name, address, and date of birth appearing on a valid identification document
... of the transferee containing a photograph of the transferee...;
(B) a statement that the transferee-
(i) is not under indictment for, and has not been convicted in any court of, a crime
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding 1 year;
(ii) is not a fugitive from justice;
(iii) is not an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance...(iv) has not been adjudicated as a mental defective or been committed to a mental
institution;(v) is not an alien who is illegally or unlawfully in the United States;(vi) has not been discharged from the Armed Forces under dishonorable conditions;
and (vii) is not a person who, having been a citizen of the United States, has re-
nounced citizenship;
(C) the date the statement is made; and(D) notice that the transferee intends to obtain a handgun from the transferor.
Id.
35 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(1XA)(iXlV) (Supp. V 1993). This section prohibits any licensed gun
dealer, importer, or manufacturer from selling, delivering, or transferring a handgun to an
individual unless the transferor "within 1 day after the transfer furnishes the statement,
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The Act also requires the CLEO to destroy the sworn statement
within twenty days of a determination that the prospective pur-
chaser is ineligible to receive the handgun. 6
In May of 1994, Sheriff Jay Printz of Ravilli County, Montana
commenced an action challenging the constitutionality of the Act's
background check provision. 7 Sheriff Printz demanded the Act be
declared unconstitutional and that it be permanently enjoined on
grounds that the commands to the CLEO were beyond the enu-
merated powers delegated to Congress, and violated the Tenth 3
and Fifth 9 Amendments to the Constitution.4 ° Writing for the
District Court of Montana, Judge Charles C. Lovell declared that
the background check provision 41 of the Act was a mandatory duty
for the CLEOs42 and exceeded the powers delegated to Congress
transmitted a copy of the statement to the chief law enforcement officer of the place of
residence of the transferee." Id.
36 18 U.S.C. § 922(sX96XB) (Supp. V 1993). This provision states:
Unless the chief law enforcement officer to whom a statement is transmitted under
paragraph (1XAXiXIV) determines that a transaction would violate Federal, State, or
local law-
(i) the officer shall, within 20 business days after the date the transferee made the
statement on the basis of which the notice was provided, destroy the statement, any
record containing information derived from the statement, and any record created as a
result of the notice required by paragraph (1)(AXI)(III);
(ii) the information contained in the statement shall not be conveyed to any person
except a person who has a need to know in order to carry out this subsection; and
(iii) the information contained in the statement shall not be used for any purpose
other than to carry out this subsection.
Id.
37 18 U.S.C. § 922(sX2) (Supp. V 1993).
38 Printz v. United States, 854 F. Supp. 1503, 1506 (D. Mont. 1994). Sheriff Printz
claimed that the mandates to the CLEOs surpass the powers delegated to Congress by the
United States Constitution under article 1, section 8, and violate the Tenth Amendment to
the Constitution. Id.
89 Id. at 1507. Sheriff Printz claimed that, due to "vagueness" the Act violates the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id. Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(a5), the CLEO would
be subject to criminal penalties for failure to make a "reasonable effort" to ascertain
whether the transfer of the handgun would violate the law. 854 F. Supp. at 1507. The court
held that the "reasonable effort" standard was too vague and that subjecting the CLEO to
criminal penalties for failure to satisfy such a vague standard would violate due process.
Printz, 854 F. Supp. at 1510. The court concluded that the criminal penalty provision,
therefore, must not be held to apply to CLEOs. Id. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMER-
icAN CONSTrruTIONAL LAw § 15-3, at 1308-09 (2d ed. 1988) (outlining sources of liberty
protected by Fifth Amendment).
40 Printz, 854 F. Supp. at 1506.
41 18 U.S.C. § 922(sX2) (Supp. V 1993); see supra note 33 (discussing requirements of
background check provision).
42 Printz, 854 F. Supp. at 1512. To refute the Government's claim that the background
check was a "discretionary" duty of the CLEOs, Judge Lovell noted extensive legislative
history that indicated otherwise. Id. at 1511-12. Judge Lovell dispelled any doubt as to the
discretionary nature of the provision by noting that a proposed amendment making the
background check discretionary was rejected by the House Judiciary Committee. Id. at
1512.
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by the Constitution.4" Judge Lovell reasoned that the Supreme
Court's holding in New York v. United States"4 established that
the federal government could not commandeer legislative
processes of the states by directly compelling them to enforce a
federal regulatory program.45
II. THE TENTH AMENDMENT DEBATE: AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
The central tenet of federalism, 46 that Congress has specific
enumerated powers,47 with any remaining powers being reserved
to the states,48 has never obtained universal approval.49 Hence,
the concept of federalism presented the Supreme Court with a
number of formidable questions50 involving state sovereignty and
48 Printz v. United States, 854 F. Supp. 1503, 1519-20 (D. Mont. 1994) (declaring Act
unconstitutional because it exceeded Congress's powers under Constitution).
44 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992). See infra notes 78-87 and accompanying text (discussing ra-
tionale and holding of Court).
45 Printz, 854 F. Supp. at 1513. The court also noted that the Constitution grants Con-
gress the power to regulate individuals, not states. Id. at 1514.
46 See supra note 2 and accompanying text (defining concept of federalism and division of
powers).
47 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (granting Congress power to lay and collect
taxes); U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 2 (granting Congress power to borrow money on credit of
United States); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress power to regulate commerce
among several states); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (granting Congress power to make all
laws which are necessary and proper).
48 U.S. CoNST. amend. X. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Consti-
tution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people." Id.
49 See Joseph Lipner, Imposing Federal Business on Officers of the States: What the
Tenth Amendment Might Mean, 57 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 907, 922 (1989). Prior to ratifying
the Constitution, many feared that the strange federal system that would be established by
the Constitution was "imperium in imperio," one sovereignty within the other, and that
federal power would consume state power. Id.; cf United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124
(1941). In Darby, Justice Harlan Fisk Stone, referred to the Tenth Amendment as a "tru-
ism" and noted that the Amendment, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, does not de-
prive the federal government "of authority to resort to all means for the exercise of a
granted power which are appropriate and plainly adapted to the permitted end." Id. But see
Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975) (construing constitutionality of Economic
Stabilization Act of 1970 under the Commerce Clause as applied to state employees).
"While the Tenth Amendment has been characterized as a truism'... it is not without
significance. The Amendment expressly declares the constitutional policy that Congress
may not exercise power in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or their ability to
function effectively in a federal system." Id. See generally TRImE, supra note 39, §§ 5-20 to -
24, at 378-400. Tribe notes that federalism's popularity is not the issue, "but whether prin-
ciples of federalism are implicit in our national charter." Id. § 5-24, at 400. If these princi-
ples do exist, he argues, then courts should not ignore them merely because federalism is
an unpopular concept. Id.; see also Van Alstyne, supra note 2, at 771 (noting irrelevance of
national majority opinion on limits of congressional power).
50 See supra note 5 (providing examples of Supreme Court's struggle with interpretation
of Tenth Amendment).
19941 PRINTZ v. UNITED STATES 187
exemptions from federal regulatory power. 1 The proper constitu-
tional balance between federal and state powers is a volatile is-
sue52 dividing the Court since the days of Chief Justice John Mar-
shall.5 3 Whether the federal judiciary should intervene to defend
the autonomy of state governments 54 has given rise to many of the
Court's more perplexing cases.55
From the early nineteenth century5 6 to the Supreme Court's de-
cision in New York v. United States,57 the Court stressed the con-
stitutional value of viable autonomous states in our system.58 Af-
ter changing its position four times in this century,59 including a
reversal in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority
51 See TRIBE, supra note 39, §§ 5-20 to -22, at 378-97 (discussing importance of Supreme
Court decisions regarding state sovereignty).
62 New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2417 (1992). "[Tihe task of ascertaining
the constitutional line between federal and state power has given rise to many of the
Court's most difficult and celebrated cases." Id.; see also United States v. Kahriger, 345
U.S. 22, 25 (1953) (holding that "bookie tax" was within Congressional power). Justice
Stanley Reed observed that in the area of Congress's power to tax, "a final definition of the
line between state and federal power has baffled judges and legislators." Id. at 29. Justice
Felix Frankfurter dissented in Kahriger and argued that the tax was to regulate conduct
outside the scope of congressional authority, and that, in order to legitimize the regulation
of such conduct, "Congress wrapped the legislation in the verbal cellophane of a revenue
measure." Id. at 37-38 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
53 See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 316, 401 (1819). The main issue raised
in McCulloch was whether Congress had the authority to incorporate a bank. Id. In holding
that Congress did have such authority, Chief Justice John Marshall, noted the absence of
the word "expressly" from the Tenth Amendment. Id. at 406. This absence, he argued, sup-
ports his conclusion that Congressional power is not limited to the powers expressly enu-
merated in the Constitution. Id. at 421-22.
54 See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 554 (1985) (recognizing
that protection of states under Commerce Clause is procedural in nature, not substantive).
55 See supra note 5 (citing Supreme Court cases involving Tenth Amendment issues).
56 See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,410 (1819). Writing for the Court,
Chief Justice Marshall stated: "In America, the powers of sovereignty are divided between
the government of the Union, and those of the States. They are each sovereign, with respect
to the objects committed to it, and neither sovereign with respect to the objects committed
to the other." Id.
57 See supra note 4 and accompanying text (noting New York's and Garcia's recognition
of importance of state sovereignty).
58 See Lipner, supra note 49, at 919 (commenting on Supreme Court's importance of con-
stitutional value of states in U.S. governmental system).
59 Compare Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276 (1918) (striking down statute re-
moving products of child labor from interstate commerce as regulation of purely local activ-
ities) with Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528,556 (1985) (overruling
National League of Cities by holding that state participation in congressional action is ef-
fective restraint on Congressional power) and National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S.
833, 851 (1976) (holding that Congress's imposition of minimum wage on state employees
interferes with state's ability to function as independent body) and United States v. Darby,
312 U.S. 100, 116 (1941) (overruling Hammer by holding that Congress's power under
Commerce Clause is limited only by specific prohibitions of Constitution); see also New
York v. United States, 112 U.S. 2408, 2423 (1992) (finding that Commerce Clause forbids
Congress from forcing states to regulate interstate commerce).
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merely nine years ago,6" the Court has attempted to lay a more
concrete foundation of Tenth Amendment limitations on federal
power.6 '
A survey of the decisions interpreting the Tenth Amendment
from National League of Cities v. Usery62 to New York 63 demon-
strates the Amendment's fractious and complex history.6 4 Two
standards for determining the constitutionality of a congressional
act have emerged.6 5 One standard consists of generally applicable
laws which regulate the activities of both state and private enter-
prises, 66 while the other one involves federal laws that direct or
influence states to legislate according to a federal regulation.67
60 See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 531 (overruling National League of Cities and holding that
state sovereignty would be more adequately protected by procedural safeguards inherent in
federal system rather than by judiciary).
61 Garcia, 469 U.S. at 531 (noting judiciary is not proper channel for protecting state
sovereignty); see also New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2428 (commenting that states cannot be
forced to choose between two unconstitutional coercive acts required by Congress).
62 426 U.S. 823 (1976).
63 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2420 (1992). Two separate schools of thought emerged from these
cases. Id. One embraced the mandate that the states were adequately protected by the
political processes of the federal government and that generally applicable laws were al-
ways constitutional. Id. The other branch reasserted the strength of Tenth Amendment
interpretation to cast aside federal regulatory legislation that sought to commandeer the
states as states. Id. For cases following National League of Cities, see New York v. United
States, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992), South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988), EEOC v.
Wyoming, 460 U.S. 528 (1985), FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982), Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n., Inc., 452 U.S. 264 (1981). See supra note 5 and
accompanying text (recognizing modern-day struggle to define power of Tenth Amendment
began in 1975 with National League of Cities and was followed by flurry of six lengthy
opinions over period of fifteen years that modified and then overruled its theory).
64 See supra note 5 and accompanying text (describing recent history of Supreme Court
Tenth Amendment cases).
65 See Scott Gardner, Recent Decision, New York v. United States, 31 DuQ. L. REv. 877,
881-82 (1993) (explaining two types of standards developed to determine whether congres-
sional act violates Tenth Amendment).
66 Id. (noting that Justice O'Connor's review of recent Tenth Amendment cases distin-
guishes between two lines of interpretation); see also South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S.
505, 513-14 (1988) (explaining generally applicable law which sought to control or influence
state regulation in FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982)); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro.
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 552 (1985) (holding that Tenth Amendment protection is
merely procedural presumption that generally applicable law is constitutional unless state
can show that it was excluded from political process); National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at
836 (addressing generally applicable law, Fair Labor Standards Act which attempted to
regulate activities of all state and local government employees).
67 See Gardner, supra note 65, at 882 (noting that Court in Hodel stated Congress cannot
directly compel state legislatures to enforce or enact federal regulatory program); see also
FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 764-65 (1982) (upholding federal act since it did not
compel states to legislate); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452
U.S. 264, 288 (1981) (upholding federal act since it did not compel states to legislate but
gave option to legislate in accordance with federal standard or to face federal preemption
in field or reduction in federal funding). But see New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2428 (declaring
provision of federal act unconstitutional because it commandeered the states to choose be-
tween two unconstitutional regulatory programs).
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In Garcia, the case that overturned the Tenth Amendment pre-
cedent established in National League of Cities,68 the Court held
that the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") could be applied to a
municipal transit system without violating the sovereignty of the
several states. 69 Garcia, casting aside the "traditional government
acts" test7 ° for which National League of Cities and its progeny
struggled to set parameters, decided that the states are protected
by the procedural safeguards of the federal system and not by any
external judicial enforceability. 7 ' The Court also noted that gener-
ally applicable laws, such as the FLSA, are constitutional under
the Commerce Clause.72 One commentator warned that the im-
426 U.S. 833, 842-43 (1976). The National League of Cities test attempted to draw a
line by using the Tenth Amendment to limit the exercise of one of Congress's enumerated
powers. Id. But see Barrante, supra note 6, at 265. (noting that in this regard, Court was
wrong.)
69 Barrante, supra note 6, at 262. The author stated that Garcia should be limited in its
enforceability to specific applications of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. Id.
Garcia was wrongly decided if courts can no longer apply the Tenth Amendment to uncon-
stitutional acts of Congress. Id. at 263. The author noted that Justice Lewis Powell re-
marked that the Court rejected "almost 200 years of the understanding of the constitu-
tional status of federalism." Id. (quoting Garcia, 469 U.S. at 560).
70 See National League of Cities, 426 U.S. 823, 852 (1976) (describing how Tenth Amend-
ment prevents federal government from interfering with functions traditionally performed
by state and local governments; this test was overruled as being too difficult to consistently
apply in Garcia).
71 See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 550-55. It appeared implicit that Justice Blackmun's referral
to "externally imposed limits" meant that the judiciary should not use the Tenth Amend-
ment to curb congressional intrusion onto the states. Id. However, Garcia should not be
read in this light outside of powers specifically delegated to Congress under the Commerce
Clause because the "[Supreme] Court cannot abdicate its constitutional responsibility to
oversee the Federal Government's compliance with its duty to respect the legitimate inter-
ests of the States." Garcia, 469 U.S. at 581 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Barrante, supra note
6, at 265. The commentator suggested that National League of Cities simply set the stage
for Garcia because National League of Cities misconstrued the division of powers recog-
nized and protected by the Tenth Amendment. Id. National League of Cities was not a
strong Tenth Amendment case because it attempted to recognize Congress's powers under
the Commerce Clause as delegated powers which were limited. Id. One important point
that the Garcia Court neglected to address was that "[it was the basic philosophy of Mar-
bury v. Madison that if Congress passed a law that did not comport with its powers under
the Constitution, the courts were bound not to enforce such law." Id. at 274. The author
argued that the Garcia Court limited the power of judicial review by claiming, "the state's
continued role in the federal system is primarily guaranteed not by any externally imposed
limits on the commerce power." Id.
72 See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 547-48 (1985). Writing
for the Garcia majority, Justice Harry Blackmun found that state power was not guaran-
teed by any external limits imposed on the Commerce Clause. Id. However, this implication
that the Tenth Amendment is not judicially enforceable should only apply to Commerce
Clause powers and other specific delegated duties of Congress. Id. at 553-55. In this case,
Garcia would overrule Printz on the basis that the political process of government, and not
the Tenth Amendment, protects states' rights. Id. at 551-53. "The states continued role in
the federal system is primarily guaranteed not by any externally imposed limits on the
commerce power, but by the structure of the federal government itself. In these cases, the
political process effectively protected that role." Id. at 528-29. However, the legislation Gar-
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plicit result of Garcia was that courts are instructed to not "con-
sider whether the Tenth Amendment is a barrier to legislation
that Congress claims is enacted under the commerce power."71
The cases between National League of Cities and Garcia struggled
with National League of Cities' test and are not wholly pertinent
to the Tenth Amendment equation.74
Following Garcia, South Carolina v. Baker 75 upheld the theory
that representation by the states in the political process ade-
quately protected state sovereignty against intrusive legislation.76
Garcia probably would not apply to Printz or the Act, because the
cia analyzed dealt specifically with Commerce Clause powers. Id. at 554. "[T]he fundamen-
tal limitation that the constitutional scheme imposes on the Commerce Clause to protect
the 'States as States' is one of process rather than one of result. Any substantive restraint
on the exercise of Commerce Clause powers must find its justification in the procedural
nature of this basic limitation .... " Id. at 554. The Act does not appear to involve interstate
commerce, although other sections of the Gun Control Act deal with the interstate com-
merce of weapons. See H.R. REP. No. 103-344, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., n.12 (1993) (citing 18
U.S.C. § 922(g) (1988)). The report categorized specific classes of persons prohibited from
receiving firearms which have moved in interstate commerce: those convicted of crimes
punishable by more than one year of prison; fugitives; illegal users of controlled substances;
mentally defective persons; persons committed to mental institutions; illegal aliens; per-
sons who have been dishonorably discharged from the Armed Forces; and those who have
renounced U.S. citizenship. Id. Furthermore, § 922(s)(2) is aimed specifically at requiring
action by local law enforcement. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(2) (Supp. V 1993); Printz v.
United States, 854 F. Supp. 1503, 1513 (D. Mont. 1994). Every post-enactment opinion,
including the contrary holding of Koog v. United States, 852 F. Supp. 1376 (W.D. Tex.
1994) has noted this fact in its analysis of the Act. 854 F. Supp. at 1513; see, e.g., Frank v.
United States, 860 F. Supp. 1030 (D. Vt. 1994); McGee v. United States, No. CivA. 2:94-
CV-67PS, 1994 WL 506156 (S.D. Miss., June 3, 1994) (declaring section 922(sX2) unconsti-
tutional mandate that exceeds Congress's power); Koog v. United States, 852 F. Supp.
1376, 1378 (W.D. Tex 1994); Barrante, supra note 6, at 265. The author noted that the
Garcia holding should only apply to Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause and
commerce should be limited in definition to commercial activities and should not apply to
pure state governmental functions such as law enforcement. Id.; Martha A. Field, Garcia v.
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority: The Demise of a Misguided Doctrine, 99
HARV. L. REv. 84, 85-88 (1985) (discussing power of Congress in relation to state sover-
eignty); Russell K Osgood, Governmental Functions and Constitutional Doctrine: The His-
torical Constitution, 72 CoRNEi.L L. REv. 553, 580-85 (1987) (discussing how courts inter-
preted commerce power following National League of Cities).
73 See Barrante, supra note 6, at 262.
74 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (holding that Fair
Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") minimum wage and overtime requirements do not violate
any constitutional provision and are not destructive of state sovereignty); EEOC v. Wyo-
ming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983) (holding that specific language of Commerce Clause does not
provide special limitation on actions of Congress with respect to states); FERC v. Missis-
sippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982) (stating that congressional conclusion that limited federal regu-
lation of retail sales of electricity and natural gas, as supported by legislative history, was
necessary to protect national economy as well as to protect interstate commerce). None of
these three cases addressed the "commandeering of state legislatures" test that Hodel dis-
cussed, preferring to dispose of their issues on grounds other than the Tenth Amendment
conflict.
75 485 U.S. 505 (1988).
76 Id. at 512.
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Act is not a generally applicable law but rather specifically singles
out only CLEOs.77
New York 71 was a recent attempt by the Supreme Court to de-
velop a balance between the powers of the federal government and
the states' interests under the Tenth Amendment. 79 Akin to
Printz, New York8 ° addressed a federal law that compelled the
states to follow federal regulations. 8 ' In New York, two counties 2
filed suit challenging the constitutionality of the Low-Level Radio-
active Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 (the "Low-Level
Waste Act").8 3 The amendments were passed in response to the
nation's low-level waste disposal crisis, 4 and required the states
to develop low-level waste disposal sites either separately or in
conjunction with other states.8 5 The Court held the Low-Level
Waste Act's "take-title" provision, which required the states to
either accept ownership of the waste or regulate according to Con-
gress's instructions, unconstitutional"6 because it exceeded Con-
gress's enumerated powers and violated the Tenth Amendment.
7
In Printz, the court applied the Supreme Court's current Tenth
Amendment analysis and held that the background check provi-
77 Printz v. United States, 854 F. Supp. 1503, 1515 (D. Mont. 1994) (holding CLEOs are
singled out to perform specific duties, thus Act cannot be viewed as generally applicable
laws).
78 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992).
79 Id. at 2417-18 (noting powers delegated to Congress in Constitution and powers re-
served to state sovereignty as power of Constitution not conferred on Congress).
80 Id.
81 See id. at 2428-29 (holding "take-title" provision of Low-Level Radioactive Waste Pol-
icy Amendments Act of 1985 unconstitutional since it commandeered states to regulate
according to Congress's instructions); Printz, 854 F. Supp. at 1519-20 (holding provision of
Act unconstitutional since it forced states to administer federal regulatory program).
82 New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2417. The County of Allegheny had three potential sites and
the County of Cortland had two potential sites. Id.
83 New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2411 (1992) (stating compromise that
states were to provide for disposal of low-level radioactive waste generated within state).
84 See H.R. REP. No. 314, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2 (1985), reprinted in 1985
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2974, 3007-08 (commenting in response to fear of potentially not having any
low-level radioactive disposal sites, separate Low-Level Radioactive Waste bill was
enacted).
85 42 U.S.C. § 2021d(a) (1988). This section provides for regional compacts for disposal of
low-level radioactive waste in general. Id. This section also provides that such disposal will
be most safely and effectively achieved on a regional basis. Id. § 2021d(a). The statute also
provides that "the states may enter into such compacts as may be necessary to provide for
the establishment and operation of regional disposal facilities for low level radioactive
waste." Id. § 2021d(aX2).
86 New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2429 (1992) (noting that provision is
inconsistent based on Congress's enumerated powers or state sovereignty reserved by
Tenth Amendment established by Constitution).
8 Id.
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sion was an unconstitutional intrusion of federal legislation on the
states and thereby violated the Tenth Amendment.'8 It appears
that the court appropriately choose the New York standard be-
cause Garcia is relevant to laws of general applicability, whereas
the Act only mandates duties on local CLEOs.
III. ANALYZING PRLz: THE BRADY ACT'S BACKGROUND CHECK
PROVISION AS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL COMMANDEERING
OF STATE POWER
In Printz, the court held that the background check provision
unconstitutionally commandeered Montana's powers and indi-
rectly encroached on Montana's legislature.8 9 The Printz court rec-
ognized that the Act imposes an unfunded federal mandate on lo-
cal government, thus exceeding Congress's powers under the
Constitution.90 In order to implement this provision, local CLEOs
and state-elected bodies would be required to provide the funds for
the background check, thus reducing state budgeting for other ar-
88 Printz v. United States, 854 F. Supp. 1503, 1517 (D. Mont. 1994) (holding Act uncon-
stitutional because of its coercive effect on state police powers).
89 Printz v. United States, 854 F. Supp. 1503, 1519 (D. Mont. 1994) (noting that un-
funded federal mandate is beyond Congress's powers); see also New York v. United States,
112 S. Ct. 2408, 2417 (1992). The Supreme Court noted that Tenth Amendment questions
can be viewed from two different angles: the court either can inquire whether an act of
Congress is authorized by a power delegated to it in Article I of the Constitution, or
whether an act of Congress invades a state's sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amend-
ment. Id.; see, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 531, 552
(1985) (upholding application of act regulating wages, hours of public and private employ-
ees to municipally-owned transit company, and holding that political process, not judiciary,
was responsible for protecting state sovereignty from federal encroachment); Perez v.
United States, 402 U.S. 146, 156-57 (1971) (finding that "loan sharking in its wide-scaled
national setting affects interstate commerce, thereby violating Congressional legislation of
Consumer Credit Protection Act, Title II); Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71, 81
(1869) (holding that clause in congressional act making United States notes legal tender for
debts has no reference to taxes imposed by state); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316 (1819) (remarking that states cannot infringe upon Congress's enumerated
powers to restrict Congress's act). When the case involves a dispute between federal and
state division of authority, "the two inquires are mirror images of each other." New York,
112 S. Ct. at 2417.
90 Printz, 854 F. Supp. at 1519. In reaching its conclusion, the Printz court used the
rationale of drawing a parallel between the "take-title" provision ruled unconstitutional in
New York and the background check provision of the Act concluding that "like the 'take-
title' provision contained in the statute in New York, the Act contains provisions inconsis-
tent with the Constitution's division of authority between federal and state governments."
Id. at 1513.
In Printz, the background check is comparable to the "take-title" provision because, de-
spite the lack of official legislation, beth are commands by federal government to state exec-
utives to administer portions of the respective Acts to achieve their purposes. 854 F. Supp.
at 1513.
See also Albe, supra note 21, at B6 (stating that "Brady law went too far by illegally
forcing local law enforcement agencies to do Washington's bidding with local resources").
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eas.91 The CLEOs would also be required to contribute worker
hours to perform background checks ranging from "15 minutes to
six hours" to determine whether a gun transaction would violate
the law.92 To make such a determination, the CLEO would have to
learn about pertinent federal and state law.93 Moreover, a diver-
sion of funds could result in an adverse impact on the ability of the
CLEO to interact with other law enforcement departments.94
Thus, the federal government has transferred responsibility and
accountability for its regulatory program to the states,95 infring-
ing upon their police power and singling out state officers.96
91 854 F. Supp. at 1512-13 (noting that issue in Printz turns on the constitutionality of
federally imposed, unfunded mandates); see also Mack v. United States, 856 F. Supp. 1372,
1375 (D. Ariz. 1994) (illustrating that sheriff did not have either personnel or funds to do
what Act required of him); Zelinsky, supra note 13, at 1336 (addressing tendency of federal
and state officials to impose unfinanced mandates on lower-level governments despite its
universal condemnation).
92 Frank v. United States, 860 F. Supp. 1030, 1032 (D. Vt. 1994). The CLEOs are re-
quired to ascertain within five business days whether receipt or possession of the handgun
by the applicant will violate the law. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(sX2) (Supp. V 1993)). Such
a determination involves researching whether local and state records are available as well
as researching the national system maintained by the Attorney General. Id. The length of
time to be devoted by the CLEO, apparently, will depend on the strength of the systems
utilized. Id.; see also Mack, 856 F. Supp. at 1375 (discussing sheriff's allegations that Act
will require him to search nine categories of records which he does not have personnel or
funds to do).
93 Printz v. United States, 854 F. Supp. 1503, 1515 (D. Mont. 1994). In addition to the
time and effort which will be required to research local, state, and federal records, the
CLEO must also expend a substantial amount of time to learn the relevant law so that he
may perform these checks correctly. Id.; see also Mack, 856 F. Supp. at 1375 (addressing
sheriff's allegations that his state law responsibilities do not encompass or include type of
investigations required by Brady).
94 Printz, 854 F. Supp. at 1514. Frustrated citizens might begin to hold public officials
accountable for any inefficiency and unresponsiveness which results from a diversion of
funds to support the Act's provisions. Id.
95 Id. at 1515. The court addressed the accountability issue at great length, indicating
that although CLEOs and state and local elected officials will be held accountable for the
diversion or raising of funds to implement the Act, the program's cost should be borne by
the federal government. Id. The state is forced under this provision to expend its time and
resources toward the implementation of a background check system. Id.; see Mack 856 F.
Supp. at 1381 (stating that states are forced to expend time and resources toward imple-
mentation of Act); see also New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2428 (1992). Justice
O'Connor distinguished between encouragement from the federal government, which is
constitutionally permissible, and federally mandated coercion. Id. Thus, by "encouraging a
State to conform to federal policy choices, the residents of the state retain the ultimate
decision as to whether the state will comply." Id. Congress may condition receipt of federal
funds upon specific requirements requested of the states or it may act pursuant to the
Commerce Clause and preempt the state law through federal legislation. Id. However,
when the federal government demands a state to perform a duty, without preempting the
state law, such a "provision is inconsistent with the federal structure of Government estab-
lished by the Constitution." Id at 2429.
9 See Barrante, supra note 6, at 269 (noting that power to penalize criminal activity and
provide police to enforce laws is reserved to states). In each federal district court case that
ruled on the Act, the sheriff, as CLEO of the jurisdiction, was found to have standing to
bring the cause of action. See Mack v. United States, 856 F. Supp. 1372, 1378 (D. Ariz.
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It is submitted that the Supreme Court would affirm the deci-
sion of Printz, as well as those of Mack v. United States,9 7 McGee
v. United States,9" and Frank v. United States,99 because the Act's
background check provision infringes on powers reserved to the
states by the Tenth Amendment, 10 0 and exceeds the scope of the
Commerce Clause."° 1 The Printz, McGee, Mack, and Frank courts
all based their rationales on New York. 10 2
Conversely, only one federal district court thus far, in Koog v.
United States,1 °3 declined to follow the lead of Printz.104 To reach
its conclusion, the Koog court applied the rationale from FERC v.
1994) (finding that Mack has standing because Act directed him, as county agent and chief
law enforcement officer, to perform its statutory mandates). It appeared that in granting
standing, the courts implicitly admitted that the sheriffs, as state officers, were being sin-
gled out by the Act and thus had capacity to sue. Id. at 1377.
97 856 F. Supp. 1372 (D. Ariz. 1994).
9s 849 F. Supp. 1147 (S.D. Miss. 1994).
99 860 F. Supp. 1030 (D. Vt. 1994).
100 U.S. CONST. amend X. "The powers not delegated to the United states by the Consti-
tution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people." Id.; see also Frank v. United States, 860 F. Supp. 1030, 1044 (D. Vt. 1994) (holding
18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(2) (Supp. V 1993) unconstitutional because Tenth Amendment prohibits
Congress from usurping state power of the Vermont Legislature); Mack v. United States,
856 F. Supp. 1372, 1381 (D. Ariz. 1994) (finding provision of Act requiring local law enforce-
ment officials to conduct reasonable background search, exceeded Congress's Article I pow-
ers in violation of Tenth Amendment); McGee v. United States, No. Civ.A. 2:94-CV-67PS,
1994 WL 506156, at *6 (S.D. Miss. June 3, 1994) (finding that Act transgressed proper
division of authority between federal and state governments under rule of New York);
Printz v. United States, 854 F. Supp. 1503, 1510 (D. Mont. 1994) (concluding that back-
ground check required by Act exceeded powers delegated to Congress and violated Tenth
Amendment of Constitution).
101 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8. Section 8 provides: 'iClongress shall have the Power... to
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States." Id.
102 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992). The Printz court found the check similar to the "take-title"
provision ruled unconstitutional in New York, 854 F. Supp. at 1513. New York State sued
the federal government, arguing that the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Amend-
ments Act of 1985 violated the Tenth Amendment. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2417. The
Court's rationale in finding the Act's "take-title" incentive unconstitutional is noteworthy.
Id. The Act sought to encourage each state to dispose of the low-level radioactive waste
generated within its borders. I& The "take-title" incentive was designed to accomplish this
goal by requiring any state which did not take title to the waste to be liable for damages in
connection with its disposal. Id. at 2415. Finding the "take-title" provision violative of the
Tenth Amendment, the Court held that the "take-title" incentive did not represent the con-
ditional exercise of any congressional power enumerated in the Constitution. Id. at 2428.
"Congress... instead held out the threat, should the States not regulate according to one
federal instruction, of simply forcing the States to submit to another federal instruction."
Id. Likewise, the Act mandated federal legislation on local CLEOs requiring performance of
three tasks once they received notification from a gun seller of a proposed transaction: de-
termination of whether receipt of the handgun would be unlawful, performance of a back-
ground check, and destruction of all documents once the transaction is approved. Printz,
854 F. Supp. at 1512.
103 852 F. Supp. 1376. (W.D. Tex. 1994).
104 Id. at 1387 (concluding that no single recent decision wholly controls interpretation
of Tenth Amendment spectrum). The court held that the Act is constitutional and consis-
tent with the Tenth Amendment. Id. at 1388.
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Mississippi'05 to find that the CLEOs' duties were minimal.10 6
Koog, however, failed to explain how it arrived at this conclu-
sion,10 7 whereas Printz and its progeny all demonstrated how the
duties placed on CLEOs can become overburdensome. 10 8 More-
over, FERC would not apply to the Act because the provisions at
issue in FERC were compelled by the Supremacy Clause, not the
Tenth Amendment, and were only of a de minimis nature.' 0 9
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's assertion of the power of the
Tenth Amendment to curb congressional intrusion" 0 in New York
is particularly applicable to Printz because the Act unconstitution-
105 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
106 Koog, 852 F. Supp at 1388 (finding that duties placed on the CLEOs are minimal and
thus constitutionally protected as proper exercise of Congressional powers). In so ruling,
the court drew a distinction between New York and an earlier Tenth Amendment case,
FERC, 456 U.S. 742 (1982). Koog, 852 F. Supp. at 1388. The Koog court noted that the
FERC court had to decide whether a federal regulation requiring a state regulatory com-
mission to consider, but not adopt, various standards was constitutional. Id. at 1382. The
Koog court recognized that the holding in FERC was that the regulations did not raise any
Tenth Amendment concerns because: (1) the states only had to consider the regulations;
and (2) the state utility regulatory commissions were equivalent to judicial tribunals and
the federal government had the right to require them to enforce federal law. Id. at 1382-83.
107 Koog, 852 F. Supp. at 1388. "The court concludes that the duties imposed on chief law
enforcement officers.., resemble more the duties created under PURPA than the com-
mand to legislate. .... Id. This conclusory analogy does little to explain how the duties are
actually minimal or why they are not excessive. Id.
108 See, e.g., Frank v. United States, 860 F. Supp. 1030, 1044 (D. Vt. 1994) (stating that
Act doubled workload with respect to conducting background checks); Mack v. United
States, 856 F. Supp. 1372, 1382-83 (D. Ariz. 1994) (noting that Act requires sheriff to per-
form duties that he does not have personnel or funds to be able to do); Printz v. United
States, 854 F. Supp. 1503, 1518 (D. Mont. 1994) (discussing CLEOs' duties to include allo-
cating resources, learning pertinent laws, and writing and destroying records).
109 See FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. at 764 (finding regulations of state private utilities
constitutional and not directly compelling where Congress adopts less intrusive scheme
allowing states to continue individual regulation in otherwise federally preemptible field on
condition that they consider federal standards). The Court found that the regulations only
required a consideration of federal proposals, that states could cease their own regulation
and thus avoid federal demands, and finally, that despite regulation, the federal govern-
ment can simply preempt the states in their regulation of private utilities. Id.; see also
Printz, 854 F. Supp. at 1516 (noting that federal program in FERC was upheld by rationale
of Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947), which involved application of Supremacy Clause as
supreme law of land); see also Frank, 860 F. Supp. at 1042 (noting that cases such as Testa
and FERC are not relevant to Tenth Amendment conflicts because they involved Con-
gress's ability to pass laws enforceable in state courts and therefore involve only applica-
tion of Supremacy Clause). Since FERC and Testa do not support the Act's proposition of
commanding a nonadjudicatory state official (the local CLEO) to carry out a federal pro-
gram, they cannot control here. Id.; see also Stephen P. Halbrook, Letters to the Editor-
Another Look at the Brady Law, WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 1994, at A18. "One court upheld the
[Act], but only because that court interpreted it to mean that record checks are optional."
Id. Stephen Halbrook was counsel for four of the sheriffs who brought suit against the Act.
Id.
110 New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2427-28.
196 ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 10:179
ally imposes congressional legislation on officers of the states."'
This coercive legislation mirrors the statute struck down in New
York, which likewise imposed an unfunded mandate on the state
without allowing a permissible alternative. 112 In New York, the
third provision of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amend-
ments Act of 1985 required states to either accept ownership of
waste or regulate according to the instructions of Congress. 1 3 The
statute's approach in New York, of requiring the state to "take-
title" to waste or follow federally imposed regulations," 4 mirrors
Printz's unfunded mandate of background checks." l The New
York Court found that this was a choice between two unconstitu-
tionally coercive regulatory programs." 6 To explain its finding,
the Court noted that the "take-title" provision would commandeer
the states "into the service of federal regulatory programs" which
is a violation of the division of authority between federal and state
governments. 117
The statute in Printz, much like that struck down in New York,
was found to be an unfunded mandate, clearly infringing upon
state autonomy. 11 In Printz, the Government argued that the Act
is constitutional because it does not place a mandatory require-
ment upon the CLEOs, and it is a law of general applicability." -9
First, the United States argued that the Act only required CLEOs
to "consider performing" a background check. 20 The Printz major-
111 Mack v. United States, 856 F. Supp. 1372, 1375 (D. Ariz. 1994); Printz v. United
States, 854 F. Supp. 1503, 1513 (D. Mont. 1994).112 New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2428.
113 Id.
114 Id.




118 Printz, 854 F. Supp. at 1519.
119 See Printz, 854 F. Supp. at 1515-16 (explaining general applicability as governing
both private and public actions). But see Frank v. United States, 860 F. Supp. 1030, 1041
(D. Vt. 1994) (noting that Government overlooked last phrase of § 922(sX2) which requires
check to include research in whatever state and local records are available); H.R. REP. No.
344, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 38-39 (1993) (rejecting amendment that would have changed
"shall make a reasonable effort" to "will make a reasonable effort"). This report stressed the
mandatory nature of the Act throughout its description of the bill: "Local law enforcement
officials are required to use the waiting period to determine whether a prospective handgun
purchaser... is prohibited by law from buying a gun." Id. at 7. "The bill requires local law
enforcement officials to make a reasonable effort to ascertain whether" the purchase would
be lawful. Id. at 10-11. -A background check of the prospective purchaser will be con-
ducted" before a lawful gun transfer can be made. Id. at 17.
120 See Printz v. United States, 854 F. Supp. at 1515-16 (D. Mont. 1994). The Govern-
ment contended that the Act was constitutional because the Act only directed the states to
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ity, however, pointed to several factors, including a House Judici-
ary Committee Report, that disputed this contention. 121 Second,
the Government argued that the Act is a law of general applicabil-
ity which does not infringe specifically upon the states as
states. 1 22 Nevertheless, the court emphasized that the nature of
the background check provision unconstitutionally singled out of-
ficers of the states and required them to perform specific duties.12
3
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
CHECK PROVISION
Severing the background check provision from the Act provides
one judicially appropriate and effective remedy for preserving the
Act's goals and does not destroy the purpose of the statute. 24 In
engage in the types of activities in which they would normally engage. Id. at 1516. The
Government's belief that the Act is constitutional was based upon four factors: (1) the law
is generally applicable and is not aimed solely at the states as states, but instead governs
both public and private actors; (2) the residual state sovereignty protected by the Tenth
Amendment is secured primarily by a state's representation in Congress; (3) the Act merely
directs a state to consider taking action; and (4) the Act only directs CLEOs to perform
their normal activity. Id. at 1515-16. As an alternative argument, the Government con-
tended that the duties placed on the CLEOs are de minimis. Id. at 1517. Several of these
points have been argued in subsequent cases. See Frank, 860 F. Supp. at 1036 (Govern-
ment interpreted Act as suggesting mandatory "discretionary" duty); Mack, 856 F. Supp. at
1383 (recognizing argument that CLEO was not under mandatory obligation to determine
legality of handgun transfers).
121 Printz, 854 F. Supp. at 1512. The House Judiciary Committee Report indicated that
the intent of Congress was to provide for mandatory background checks by the CLEOs. Id.;
see also supra note 119 and accompanying text (discussing House Report).
122 Prints, 854 F. Supp. at 1515. The Printz court rejected the Government's argument
that the Act is constitutional because it governed beth public and private actions. Id. The
court noted that unlike previous cases cited by the Government where laws were deter-
mined to be of a generally applicable nature, this is not the case, because the Act does not
subject the states to the same requirements as private actors. Id. at 1515-16 (citing Garcia
v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985)). The court reasoned that since
the Act was not generally applicable but instead legislated directly upon officers of the
states, this issue fell squarely within the holding of New York, in deciding that the federal
government may not compel states to administer a regulatory program. 854 F. Supp. at
1515.
123 Printz, 854 F. Supp. at 1512 (finding that Act mandated that CLEOs perform specific
tasks before gun transfer can be lawfully made).
124 Id. Besides the severability argument, some might question the idea of ruling on an
interim provision of the Act which will become moot by the year 1998 when a federal back-
ground check system is installed. See James Podgers, Gun Law Under Fire, Court Chal-
lenges to Brady Bill Produce Conflicting Results, A.B. J., August 1994, at 84. This view
fails to recognize the fact that the Brady issue is relevant not only to the gun control contro-
versy, but also to the province of the Tenth Amendment. See Printz, 854 F. Supp. at 1503.
Finally, underlying these debates is the possibility that the Act may face other constitu-
tional challenges on Second or Fourteenth Amendment grounds. The federal district courts
that have confronted the Tenth Amendment issue presented here have also heard claims
on the Fifth Amendment. See Mack v. United States, 856 F. Supp. 1372, 1375 (D. Ariz.
1994); Prints, 854 F. Supp. at 1507; Koog v. United States, 852 F. Supp. 1376, 1377. Fur-
thermore, the Thirteenth Amendment has also been implicated. See Mack, 856 F. Supp. at
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New York, the Court noted that first, severability is only unwar-
ranted if it is evident the legislature would not have enacted the
constitutional provisions independently of those that were found
beyond congressional power. 125 Second, the remaining provisions
of the statute must be "fully operative" as law.126 As to this re-
quirement, courts must decide if the unconstitutional provisions
are "functionally independent" from the rest of the Act.' 27 Their
elimination must not in any way alter the substantive reach of the
statute nor change its basic operation. 28 Furthermore, a provi-
sion is not independent if it is so intertwined with the constitu-
tional portions that the statute would have to be rewritten to al-
low it to stand.129 In New York, the Court applied the severability
standard1 30 to its constitutional problem and effectively preserved
the strength of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management
Amendments Act.
13 1
Applying these standards to the Act, eliminating the back-
ground check does not alter its substantive reach, change its basic
operation, nor require the court to rewrite the statute to allow it to
stand.13 2 The five-day waiting period is kept intact, purchasers
still need to provide sworn statements, and if CLEOs do decide to
perform a check, they must write an explanatory letter to any re-
1375. For now, the Printz decision provides yet another opportunity for the Supreme Court
to construct a more definitive interpretation of the Tenth Amendment. See Printz, 854 F.
Supp. at 1507. "This case turns on the proper relationship between the federal government
and the several states, and in particular, on the constitutionality of federally imposed, un-
funded mandates." Id.
125 Printz, 854 F. Supp. at 1518.
126 Id.
127 Board of Nat. Resources v. Brown, 992 F.2d 937,948 (9th Cir. 1993) (discussing ques-
tions that must be answered to satisfy severability test) (quoting United States v. Jackson,
390 U.S. 570, 586 (1968)).
128 See generally Printz, 854 F. Supp. at 1518; Mack, 856 F. Supp. at 1383; Frank, 860 F.
Supp. at 1044.
129 Printz, 854 F. Supp. at 1518.
130 See New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2434 (quoting Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S.
678, 684 (1987)).
131 112 S. Ct. at 2434. In New York, the Court observed that the "take-title" penalty at
issue was "simply in aid of the main purpose of the statute .... [It] may fail, and still the
great body of the statute have operative force. .. ." Id. (quoting Reagan v. Farmers' Loan
and Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362, 396 (1894)). Furthermore, the Low-Level Waste Act was
formed to still serve the objective of encouraging state self-sufficiency in the waste disposal
area, thereby the purpose of the Act was not defeated by excising the "take-title" provision.
Id.
132 See Frank v. United States, 860 F. Supp. 1030, 1044 (D. Vt. 1994); Mack v. United
States, 856 F. Supp. 1372, 1383 (D. Ariz. 1994); Printz v. United States, 854 F. Supp. 1503,
1518 (D. Mont. 1994); McGee v. United States, No. CivA. 2:94-CV-67PS, 1994 WL 506156,
at *5 (S.D. Miss. June 3, 1994).
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jected purchasers. 13 3 In addition, the Act does not need to be re-
written because CLEOs may retain the option of conducting their
own checks.1
3 4
When a statute contains a severability clause there is a pre-
sumption that the unconstitutional part of the statute is severa-
ble. 13 5 Since Congress could have enacted the remaining portions
of the Act without the severed provisions, the remaining portions
can stand alone.1 3 6 The Gun Control Act, which the Act amends,
contains a severability clause, therefore the presumption in favor
of elimination of the unconstitutional section arises. 3 7 Without
the mandatory background check, the Act would still achieve con-
gressional goals.' 31 CLEOs would then have the option, rather
than the obligation, to conduct background checks during the five-
day waiting period. 139 Although the plaintiffs in each case argued
that the Act would not have been enacted but for the background
check, they did not show enough evidence to overcome the pre-
sumption.1 40 Thus, each court found that the Act remained fully
operative after the unconstitutional provisions were excised, and
that Congress would have enacted the remaining sections even
without support of the severed provisions. 14 1 The central focus of
the Act is also preserved because the waiting period remains in-
tact and the prospects of a federal check system are still
available. 142
The Act could also be constitutionally improved if Congress im-
plemented an amendment urging, but not demanding CLEOs to
perform background checks. 43 Congress could exercise its taxing
and spending powers under the Constitution to provide incentives
'33 Printz v. United States, 854 F. Supp. 1503, 1518 (D. Mont. 1994).
134 Id.
135 Frank, 860 F. Supp. at 1044; Mack, 856 F. Supp. at 1383; Printz, 854 F. Supp. at
1519; McGee, 1994 WL 506156, at *6.
136 Printz v. United States, 854 F. Supp. 1503, 1518 (D. Mont 1994).
137 Mack, 856 F. Supp. at 1383; McGee, 1994 WL 506156, at *5.
138 Frank, 860 F. Supp. at 1044; Mack, 856 F. Supp. at 1383; Printz, 854 F. Supp. at
1519; McGee, 1994 WL 506156, at *6.
139 Id.
140 Frank v. United States, 860 F. Supp. 1030, 1044 (D. Vt. 1994); Mack v. United States,
856 F. Supp. 1372, 1384 (D. Ariz. 1994); Printz v. United States, 854 F. Supp 1503, 1519 (D.
Mont. 1994).
141 Frank, 860 F. Supp. at 1044.
142 Printz, 854 F. Supp. at 1517 (noting that severing § 922(s)(2) does not substantively
alter Act because provisions affecting targets of Act are left intact).
143 Id. The court recognized that severing the "ascertainment/background check" provi-
sion does not prevent CLEOs from performing such checks. Id. It simply becomes the choice
of each CLEO, not a mandated requirement forced upon him by the federal government. Id.
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to states that independently require background checks without
interfering with state police powers. 144 Congress has the ability to
tax almost any activity, even when the tax might affect an area
Congress is not authorized to regulate directly. 145 In addition,
Congress may use tax proceeds to raise national revenue and
spend for the "general welfare of the United States." 6 Thus, Con-
gress may persuade the states, through federal funding incen-
tives, to adopt federal legislation short of actual coercion."17 For
instance, Congress may require states to meet certain conditions
to be eligible for federal funds.14 Furthermore, conditions may be
imposed to influence a state's legislative choices.149 Thus, as Con-
gress has done before, it could pass legislation offering incentive
programs or withholding federal funds for those states which do or
do not require their CLEOs to perform background checks.' 50
144 New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2423-27 (1992). Similar to the provisions
of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act found to be constitutional in
New York, Congress could enact incentive measures to urge the states, without forcing
them, to perform background checks. Id. Such incentives could include a graduated basis of
reimbursement based on the amount of checks performed by each CLEO. Id. Special
awards could also be built into the system. Id. New York contains a description of constitu-
tional incentives. Id.
145 U.S. CONST. art. I, cl. 8; Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 467-68 (1978)
(holding that registration tax imposed on civil aircraft to recoup costs of federal aviation
programs does not violate immunity of state government from federal taxation when ap-
plied to state owned police plane); United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 44 (1950) (tax
statute does not fail because it reaches activities Congress might not regulate); Sonzinsky
v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 513 (1937) (tax is not any less so even if it has regulatory
effect, is burdensome, or tends to restrict activity taxed); TREBE, supra note 39, at 318.
146 U.S. CONST. art I, cl. 8. Congress has broad power to spend for the general welfare.
Id.; see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 4 (finding "for the general welfare" clause is not limit
on congressional power but grant of power of expansive scope especially when viewed in
conjunction with Necessary and Proper Clause).
147 Gorrie v. Bowen, 809 F.2d 508 (8th Cir. 1987) (Congress may impose conditions on
state receipt of federal funds under Spending Clause as effort to regulate areas it does not
have power to directly administer); see also New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408,
2423 (1992) (finding Congress may attach conditions to receipt of federal funds by state but
such conditions must bear some relationship to federal purpose).
148 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987) (holding that Secretary of Transpor-
tation could withhold federal highway funds if state failed to adopt federal minimum drink-
ing age).
149 Lewis B. Kaden, Politics, Money and State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79 COLUM.
L. REv. 847, 874-81 (1979).
150 New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2427 (1992). The Court allowed the Sec-
retary of Energy to collect taxes derived from state waste disposal and apportion it out to
states which meet federal milestones for creating their own disposal mechanisms because
the incentive is supported by an affirmative grant of congressional power and is consistent
with Tenth Amendment. Id. Furthermore, allowing states with disposal sites to increase
the cost of access and then deny it altogether to those states who fail to meet federal dead-
lines is a constitutional incentive that permits Congress to discriminate against interstate
commerce consistent with the Commerce Clause. Id.
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The states should implement their own mandatory background
check systems for gun transfers, and the federal government
should pass incentive legislation for such an operation and reim-
burse the states for their efforts. i 15 This solution appears to avoid
any constitutional conflict because the federal government would
be achieving its goals through cooperative federalism and its per-
suasive "Spending Powers".152 Consequently, the goals of the Act
would be met.'
V. NOTEWORTHY GOALS Do NOT OVERRIDE THFE ACT'S
UNCONSTrTUTIONALITY
Although public policy concerns behind the enforcement of the
Act are fundamentally sound,15 4 they cannot override a constitu-
151 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 790.06 (1993) (requiring purchasers who wish to carry con-
cealed weapons (defined as handguns, etc.) to obtain license which is only granted by De-
partment of State if applicant is resident of United States, has not been convicted of felony
or controlled substance abuse, has legitimate reason to carry such weapon, and demon-
strates competence with that weapon); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720 para. 5/24-3 (Smith-Hurd
1994) (stating that person commits offense of unlawful sale of firearms if he knowingly
"delivers any firearm of a size which may be concealed upon the person, incidental to a sale
without withholding delivery of such firearm for at least seventy-two hours after applica-
tion for its purchase has been made"); N.J. REv. STAT. § 2C:58-4 (1994) (requiring each
application for permit to carry handgun to be submitted to chief police officer of each re-
spective jurisdiction who shall then take fingerprints, compare prints with all necessary
records, record full description of all guns intended to be carried, determine purchaser does
not suffer from any statutory disabilities, and has justifiable need to carry gun); N.Y. PE-
NAL LAw § 400.00 (McKinney 1994) (requiring that before any license to carry, possess,
repair, or dispose of firearms is granted, gun owner must undergo complete investigation of
his mental health, his criminal record, his fingerprints, and his purposes and intentions to
use weapon); 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 6109 (1994) (requiring gun purchasers in Penn-
sylvania to fill out application requiring statement of purpose, competency, and legitimacy
and requiring sheriffs of each jurisdiction to make complete investigation into criminal
records and into applicants' character and reputation); see also Albo, supra note 21, at B6.
Although Phoenix was one jurisdiction that challenged and defeated the Act, Arizona al-
ready has established instant background check system for gun purchasers allowing retail-
ers to access several criminal records databases with no charge to them. Id. These states
already have statutory provisions requiring extensive background checks to be performed
prior to obtaining a gun or a permit to carry, possess, or repair one. Id.152 See supra notes 145-49 and accompanying text.
155 See Albo, supra note 21, at B6 (detailing Arizona's background check system as alter-
native to Act). Since the states may mandate requirements on their own police powers
through state legislation, a state funded background check meets the goals of the Act with-
out causing the dilemma of an unconstitutional unfunded federal mandate. Id.
154 See Frank v. United States, 860 F. Supp. 1030, 1043 (D. Vt. 1994). "I do not question
the sincerity of those who have worked for passage of the Brady Act .... ." Id.; see also
Laurel Loomis, A New Look at Gun Control Legislation: Responding to a Culture of Vio-
lence, 27 Bzv. His B. ASS'N J. 160 passim (1993); Jay R. Wagner, Gun Control Legislation
and the Intent of the Second Amendment: To What Extent is There an Individual Right to
Keep and Bear Arms?, 37 Vn.L. L. REv. 1407 1434-44 (1992). But see Bob Dole, The Brady
Bill: It's Just Not Enough, 3 KAN. J.L. & PuB. POLY 135, 135 (1993-94) (suggesting problem
with Act is that local police do not have adequate systems to check information Act man-
dates, and that federal computerized system is desired solution).
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tional violation.'5 5 Congressional regulatory schemes that do not
involve commerce should be controlled by the Tenth Amendment.
The state police power should not be impeded by emergency public
policy measures, nor under the auspices of the Commerce
Clause. 156 Although gun control is a laudable goal, a crisis of simi-
lar proportion did not blind the New York Court when it encoun-
tered unconstitutional federal legislation. 15 7
The fear of violence and crime has caused a majority of the na-
tion's citizens to favor gun control and to overlook contrary consti-
tutional authority.'58 This is evidenced by the failure of major
U.S. newspapers to report on Printz.-59 While Koog received
155 See Frank, 860 F. Supp. at 1043 (noting that although Act was created for laudable
ends, unconstitutional means cannot be used to justify noteworthy purpose).
156 See Barrante, supra note 6, at 269. In addition to violating the power of the states,
the author notes that federal regulatory schemes can also violate individual rights. Id.
"[Flederal overreaching under the Commerce Clause undermines the constitutionally man-
dated balance of power between the States and the Federal Government, a balance
designed to protect our fundamental liberties." Garcia, 469 U.S. at 572 (Powell, J., dissent-
ing). Professor Laurence Tribe sums this argument up best, stating that when Congress
passes policy-based legislation, "that endangers the provision of certain vital services...
[it] is constitutionally problematic ... because it hinders and may even foreclose attempts
by states ... to meet their citizens' legitimate expectations of basic government services."
TRIBE, supra note 39, at 313-14.
157 See Barrante, supra note 6, at 269 (discussing how police powers are reserved exclu-
sively to states). The powers of government are reserved to the states insofar as any power
is not specifically granted to Congress under the Constitution. Id.
158 See ACLU, PoLicY GUIDE OF THE AMERcAN CIvIL LIBERTIES UNION, Policy No. 47
(rev. ed. 1992) (arguing that "[e]xcept for lawful police and military purposes, the posses-
sion of weapons by individuals is not constitutionally protected"). The debate over gun con-
trol stems from the divergent views of state's rights versus individual's rights under the
Second Amendment right to bear arms. Id.; see also Stanford Levinson, The Embarrassing
Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 640 n.19 (quoting LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTrrUTIONAL LAw 299 n.6 (2d ed. 1988) (stating that "history of the [Second] Amend-
ment indicate[s] that the central concern of [its] framers was to prevent such federal inter-
ferences with the state militia as would permit the establishment of a standing national
army")). But see Wagner, supra note 154, at 1434-44. The author cites numerous sources
from the Federalist Papers and notes that the Framers intended the Second Amendment to
confer an individual right to keep and bear arms because the people needed the opportu-
nity for defense if an organized military ever attempted oppression. Id.; see also New York
v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2414 (1992) (discussing problems confronting nation dur-
ing 1980's concerning disposal of low-level radioactive waste). In New York, the Court
found that although the federal government was trying to rectify a serious crisis, offering a
choice between two unconstitutional federal regulatory programs is no choice at all. Id.;
Lingelbach, supra note 14, at 560 (giving brief history of crisis that erupted around debate
of what to do with low-level radioactive waste).
159 See Federal Judge in Texas Upholds Brady Gun Control Measure, WASH. POST, June
2, 1994, at A13. Several major newspapers reported the outcome of Koog v. United States,
which upheld the constitutionality of the Brady Act while hardly giving any attention to
Printz v. United States which was decided before Koog and ruled the Act unconstitutional.
Id.; see also Federal Judge Upholds Brady Gun Law, MxLn HERALD, June 2, 1994, at 9A
(each article only briefly mentioning Printz outcome in one line of text); Judge Upholds
Background Checks in Handgun Purchases, BOSTON GLOBE, June 2, 1994, at 4 (no mention
of Printz holding).
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lengthy examination, Printz was minimized and even neglected.
Furthermore, the perception of the National Rifle Association (the
"NRA") as a group moving away from the mainstream 16 0 has con-
vinced many people of the necessity of "Brady-type" legislation, 16 1
although the NRA maintains a strong resolve to defend and ad-
vance their rights under the Second Amendment. 162 Nevertheless,
"laudable ends cannot be used to justify unconstitutional
means." 63 When confronting an urgent situation in New York,' 64
Justice O'Connor explained the fundamental importance of main-
160 Philip Weiss, Why They Shoot: A Hoplophobe Among the Gunnies, N.Y. Trams, Sep-
tember 11, 1994, § 6 (Magazine), at 66; see also Joan Biskupic, Gun-Control Supporters
Take Aim at Swing Votes, 49 CONG. Q. 604, 607 (1991). The author notes that groups such
as the National Rifle Association feel gun control is a violation of individual rights evi-
denced by one member stating "[w]e need to have a meateating NRA that won't be kind to
any legislator who votes against the citizen's right to keep and bear arms." Id.
161 See Message of the Brady Bill, WASH. POST, November 25, 1993, at A30. Although
perhaps a small step, the passage of the Act was an important event because it sends
message to the NRA and gun lobbyists that "[lt]here's no reason on civilized Earth for
quickie sales of handguns to almost anyone who comes in the door of a gun shop." Id. The
Act is also an important first step because the "absurdly cheap and loose provisions" for
obtaining a federal firearms license have been toughened through the increase of fees. Id.
Richard B. Saltman, Why Not Mandatory Gun Insurance?, WASH. POST, January 11, 1994,
at A19 (noting that legislators finally have courage to challenge gun violence through pas-
sage of Act, suggesting that such statute is only first step in confronting handgun issue,
and explaining that requiring gun purchasers to buy liability insurance would be best way
to prevent handgun misuse). But see Bill Hart, No Simple Answers or Easy Statistics in
Debate on Gun Law, PHOENIX GAZETTE, July 4, 1994, at B1 (noting opponents to Act believe
criminals seldom buy guns legally and that Act only imposes unconstitutional restrictions
on law-abiding citizens and that in reality people turned down for guns under Act were
denied permits because of minor misdemeanors such as shoplifting, trespass and traffic
offenses and not major felony offenses); Stephen P. Halbrook & Francis G. Hass, Letters to
the Editor-Another Look at the Brady Law, WASH. POST, October 8, 1994, at A18. Hal-
brook's letter noted that in Phoenix, Arizona, thirty-five denials for permits under the Act
were related to warrants for traffic or misdemeanor offenses while only four denials in-
volved felonies, and noted that the Act does not even apply in half of the states due to
availability of instant checks or other control methods. Id. In his letter, Haas noted that
original conjecture about the Act has been misleading because, for example, Illinois re-
corded 117,099 checks with no denials and Vermont had a possible 6.2 percent denial rate
while "peaceful New York had a rate of 1.6 percent." Id.
162 See Letter from Wayne LaPierre, Executive Vice President, National Rifle Associa-
tion, to potential members (November 1994) (on file with the St. John's Journal of Legal
Commentary) (stressing need to join NRA to protect individual's right to own and bear
arms). LaPierre states: "[Y]our right to own and use a firearm is in jeopardy like never
before" and "[tihe handwriting is on the wall.., the gun control alliance is winning. They
are coming closer to their goal [of] disarming law-abiding citizens ... ." Id. at 1. LaPierre
characterizes restrictive gun legislation as "harmful" to an individual's Second Amendment
rights. Id.
163 Frank v. United States, 860 F. Supp. 1030, 1043 (D. Vt. 1994) (citing New York, 112
S. Ct. at 2434).
164 New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2414-15 (discussing major crisis New York faced in disposing
of low-level radioactive waste).
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taining the separation of powers and preserving the sanctity of
our federal system.165
CONCLUSION
Although a line of modern Supreme Court decisions weakened
the Tenth Amendment, New York v. United States revitalized it by
establishing the difference between generally applicable legisla-
tion, permissible under the Commerce Clause, and prohibited fed-
eral legislation that commandeers state power. The Act fell into
this trap by mandating a regulation that intruded upon the state's
police power, a power reserved to states under the Tenth Amend-
ment. Moreover, even though the Act was designed to serve the
noble purpose of preventing the transfer of handguns to criminals
and the mentally insane, the Constitution cannot be trampled in
the process. The Act and its purpose, however, were saved when
the unconstitutional background check provision was found to be
severable.
Furthermore, a feasible proposed alternative to section 922(s)(2)
would be for Congress to pass incentive legislation, similar to the
constitutional provisions of the Act at issue in New York to per-
suade the states to implement their own mandatory check system.
This would constitutionally accomplish the Act's purpose allowing
federal and state governments to achieve their goals through coop-
erative federalism.
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165 New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2434. "[TIhe Constitution protects us from our own best in-
tentions: It divides power... so that we may resist temptation to concentrate power in one
location as an expedient solution to the crisis of the day. [The issue before the Court] is a
pressing national problem but a judiciary that licensed extra-constitutional government
with each issue of comparable gravity would in the long run be far worse." Id.
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